source classifier
A.1 Conjugate Derivations Cross-Entropy Loss: L(h,y) = cX
Pc i=1 yi = 1is satisfied, otherwise f (y) = by duality. A.2 Experiments on Binary Classification with Exponential Loss Here we present the results on a binary classification task over a synthetic dataset of 100 dimensional gaussian clusters. For Σ, similar to [23], we sample a diagonal matrix D, where each entry is sampled uniformly from a specified range, and a rotation matrix U from a HAAR distribution, giving Σ = UDUT. For the source data, we sample µ 1s,µ+1s,Σ 1s,Σ+1sas specified above with k = 0. Now to create a distribution shifted data of various severity, we sample µ 1t,µ+1t,Σ 1t,Σ+1tas specified above with k = 1, which are then used to sample the shifted data as follows: Exponential Loss for Binary Classification Let z be the classification score hθ(x). For logistic training loss, conjugate adaptation loss would default to entropy with sigmoid probability.
Unsupervised Domain Adaptation with Residual Transfer Networks
Mingsheng Long, Han Zhu, Jianmin Wang, Michael I. Jordan
The recent success of deep neural networks relies on massive amounts of labeled data. For a target task where labeled data is unavailable, domain adaptation can transfer a learner from a different source domain. In this paper, we propose a new approach to domain adaptation in deep networks that can jointly learn adaptive classifiers and transferable features from labeled data in the source domain and unlabeled data in the target domain. We relax a shared-classifier assumption made by previous methods and assume that the source classifier and target classifier differ by a residual function. We enable classifier adaptation by plugging several layers into deep network to explicitly learn the residual function with reference to the target classifier. We fuse features of multiple layers with tensor product and embed them into reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces to match distributions for feature adaptation. The adaptation can be achieved in most feed-forward models by extending them with new residual layers and loss functions, which can be trained efficiently via back-propagation. Empirical evidence shows that the new approach outperforms state of the art methods on standard domain adaptation benchmarks.
A.1 ConjugateDerivations Cross-EntropyLoss: L(h,y) = cX
Thelossesarecompared onthreedegreesofshift(easy,moderate and hard), which is controlled by the drifted distance of Gaussian clusters. Herewediscuss the architecture chosen and the implementation details. Note that the task loss / surrogate loss function is used to update the meta-loss mϕ during meta-learning. The number of transformer layers and the hidden layers in MLP are selected from{1,2}. Wecanseethatthetask loss barely affects the learnt meta loss.
A Little Robustness Goes a Long Way: Leveraging Robust Features for Targeted Transfer Attacks
Adversarial examples for neural network image classifiers are known to be transferable: examples optimized to be misclassified by a source classifier are often misclassified as well by classifiers with different architectures. However, targeted adversarial examples--optimized to be classified as a chosen target class--tend to be less transferable between architectures. While prior research on constructing transferable targeted attacks has focused on improving the optimization procedure, in this work we examine the role of the source classifier. Here, we show that training the source classifier to be slightly robust--that is, robust to small-magnitude adversarial examples--substantially improves the transferability of class-targeted and representation-targeted adversarial attacks, even between architectures as different as convolutional neural networks and transformers. The results we present provide insight into the nature of adversarial examples as well as the mechanisms underlying so-called robust classifiers.
A Little Robustness Goes a Long Way: Leveraging Robust Features for Targeted Transfer Attacks
Adversarial examples for neural network image classifiers are known to be transferable: examples optimized to be misclassified by a source classifier are often misclassified as well by classifiers with different architectures. However, targeted adversarial examples--optimized to be classified as a chosen target class--tend to be less transferable between architectures. While prior research on constructing transferable targeted attacks has focused on improving the optimization procedure, in this work we examine the role of the source classifier. Here, we show that training the source classifier to be "slightly robust"--that is, robust to small-magnitude adversarial examples--substantially improves the transferability of class-targeted and representation-targeted adversarial attacks, even between architectures as different as convolutional neural networks and transformers. The results we present provide insight into the nature of adversarial examples as well as the mechanisms underlying so-called "robust" classifiers.